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COMMENTS
The Usufructuary's Obligation to Preserve the
Property
Perhaps in the eyes of many, the institution of usufruct is a
tottering relic of the Roman law past which serves only to fetter
full enjoyment of property and to clutter the law of Louisiana
with uncertainty. Nevertheless, the institution of usufruct is
very much a part of Louisiana law. By operation of law, the
surviving spouse enjoys usufruct over the decedent's half of the
community where he has died intestate ;1 parents are entitled to
usufruct of the minor's estate in certain instances;2 moreover,
recent interpretations of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act3 serve
1. LA. Crv. CODE art. 916 (1870).
2. Id. art. 223. See Note, 22 LouiSIANA LAW REVIEW 889 (1962).
3. LA. R.S. 9:1791 (1950).
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to warn the cautious attorney that income interests placed in
trust must be in the form of usufruct lest the transfer be void-
able as a prohibited substitution.
4
It is basic civilian theory that full enjoyment of property
involves three principal rights: usus, the right to utilize the
thing for one's own purposes; fructus, the right to gather and
use the fruits of the thing; and abusus, the right to alienate -
to sell or mortgage. The usufructuary enjoys the first two
of these rights. The Civil Code defines usufruct as the right of
enjoying a thing the ownership of which is vested in another.5
The usufructuary may draw from the thing "its profits, its utility
and its advantages." If the thing can be enjoyed without chang-
ing its substance, the usufruct is "perfect." If, however, the
thing cannot be used or enjoyed except by "consuming" it, the
usufruct is "imperfect."6 The obligation of the usufructuary
having imperfect usufruct of a thing is simply to restore its
estimated value at the termination of usufruct.7 On the other
hand, where usufruct is perfect, the usufructuary must return
the thing itself, in its original condition except for normal wear
and tear and deterioration which have not been caused by his
negligence.8 The abusus, or right of alienation, remains in the
naked owner of the property, who becomes the full owner at the
termination of the usufruct.
As a general principle, the Louisiana usufructuary is bound
to care for the property as would a "prudent administrator."
In addition, he is required to use the property only as the former
owner used it without altering its "destination." He is also
bound to share, with the naked owner, certain expenses con-
nected with the property. Though there are some guidelines in
the Civil Code and a handful of cases in point, one will search
in vain for a clear and detailed statement of these obligations.
It is the purpose of this Comment to ascertain insofar as possible,
what these obligations are.
Prudent Administration
The institution of usufruct originated during the Roman
4. Succession of Meadors, 135 So.2d 679 (La. 1961); Note, 22 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEw 889 (1962).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 533 (1870). For a full discussion of "fruits" and
"profits," see Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the Law of Thing8: Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 756 (1962).
6. LA. CrvL CODE art. 534 (1870).
7. Id. art. 549.
8. Id. art. 550.
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Republic, though not until the Empire period did it become a
general legal institution. Since usufruct was not a form of
ownership, it could not be created by the usual modes of con-
veyance- not by traditio, since it was not physical but an
incorporeal right, nor by mancipatio since it was not a res
manicipi.9 Whether the usufructuary's obligation to preserve the
thing subject to usufruct was created by stipulatio, at the insist-
ence of the praetor, or existed at civil law and was merely en-
forced by him, it is clear that the standard of care to which the
usufructuary was held was that of a prudent paterfamilias, the
praetor requiring security for adherence to that standard.'0 In
essence, the standard of care required was that of "one who was
the sole owner of the family goods."" This standard was carried
into the French,12 German'3 and Louisiana 4 Civil Codes. As
nearly as can be determined, the obligation of the prudent ad-
ministrator or paterfamilias, is analogous to that of the com-
pensated bailee or "reasonable man" at common law.' 5 Though
no Louisiana court has attempted to define or apply the concept
of prudent administration in this context, perhaps the familiar
standard of the "reasonable man" would be applied should the
occasion arise.
The Obligation Not to Alter the "Destination" of the Property
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that during the usufruct,
the property must not be "altered in form, distribution or desti-
nation" or improved without the consent of the naked owner.' 6
This provision has its roots in the Rbman law. The Justinian
legislation provided that the usufructuary might enjoy the sub-
9. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BooK OF ROvAN LAW 127 et seq. (1932).
10. INSTITUTES 2.1.38; DIGEST 7.9.1.pr.
11. Digest 7.9.1.3; 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLA-
TION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2814 (1959).
12. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 601.
13. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 1036.
14. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 567 (1870).
15. Fuzier-Hermann, in his notes to Article 1137 of the French Civil Code, says
that to determine whether a person has acted in accordance with the standard of a
bon pere de jamille, one has to decide whether his conduct has been such "as one
would have expected from a sensible man managing his own affairs having
ordinary knowledge and taking ordinary care." This seems to be the same
general standard laid down in Heaven v. Pender, L.R. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883). See
also 16 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS §§ 214-216 (1876). The
distinction alleged to exist in Anglo-American law between "negligence" and "gross
negligence" does not exist at French law according to Laurent. There is only one
standard recognized by the Code, the pere de famille. It is only in exceptional
cases that another standard is recognized, as in the case of the gratuitous deposit-
ary (FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1927, 1928) ; a gratuitous agent (id. arts 1922,
1374).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 568 (1870).
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ject of the usufruct only in the manner his grantor had been
in the habit of enjoying it.'7 He might sell produce only if the
former owner had been in the habit of doing so.' 8 This prin-
ciple was applied so strictly that the usufructuary might not
even plaster a rough wall.19 If he did, he not only committed a
wrong, but this act terminated the usufruct, whether the altera-
tion had been made by him or by another responsible to him.
20
Planiol suggests that the non-alteration provisions of the
French Civil Code are susceptible to a broader construction than
indicated by their Roman law origin.21 The French Code requires
generally that "the substance of the thing be preserved. ' 22 This,
says Planiol, does not restrict the usufructuary to use the prop-
erty only in the manner of the prior owner, but requires merely
that he "does not alter what is essential to the thing." Presum-
ably, he would urge that the usufructuary should be permitted to
make such improvements and alterations on a farm, a machine,
or a going business as are necessary to keep it up to date, so
long as the economic purpose of the thing is not substantially
changed. He notes, however, that the French jurisprudence has
adhered to the narrow Roman view of non-alteration.
The Louisiana Civil Code contains precisely the same non-
alteration provisions as the French,2 but there is no interpreta-
tive jurisprudence indicating whether the courts will be inclined
to take a restricted or a liberal view towards alterations by the
usufructuary. The Louisiana Code is more specific than its civil-
ian cousins in specifying what is meant by "altering the desti-
nation of the thing." The Louisiana usufuctuary may not finish
17. RICCOBONO, STuDI BRuGi 173 et seq.
18. Ibid.
19. DIGEST 71.44.
20. DIGEST 7.4.5.2., 31; PAUL. sent. 3.6.28. Though no Louisiana court has
ordered the termination of usufruct because the usufructuary has altered the use
of the property, there is a basis for such a holding in Article 621 of the Civil Code,
which provides: "The usufruct may cease by the abuse which the usufructuary
makes in his enjoyment, either in committing waste on the estate, or in suffering
it to go to decay, for want of repairs, or in abusing in any other manner, the
things subject to the usufruct."
21. 2 PLANIOL, CrviL, LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2818 (1959).
22. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 578. The Digest language from which this pro-
vision was taken used the Latin phrase "salva rerum 8ubstantia." Planiol contends
that if the French meant to restrict the usufructuary to the use made by the
former owner, then this phrase was mistranslated as it now appears in Article 578.
2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2818 (1959).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 533 (1870) requires that the thing be used "without
altering the substance of the thing." Id. art. 568 specifies that the thing shah
not be used in such a way as to alter its "form, distribution or destination."
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buildings commenced by the owner, nor may he erect new struc-
tures unless they are necessary for working the land or growing
crops. He may not rebuild buildings which have been destroyed
by accident or deterioration, may not demolish or destroy any-
thing that has been built by the owner, nor may he take away
the materials. 24 He may not open new mines or quarries on the
land but may enjoy the product of those which were opened at
the time he entered into the usfruct.25 These provisions would
tend to indicate that the redactors of the Civil Code were thinking
of non-alteration in the narrow Roman law sense. Planiol notes
that in France, this narrow view has resulted in disallowing the
usufructuary from converting a hotel into a store, or a residence
into a warehouse, from changing the mode of cultivating land
(i.e., he may not change vineyards into plowed grounds), and
cutting trees for timber, although he may take copeswood trees.26
In Anglo-American law, the legal life tenant, whose duties
with respect to non-alteration of use are similar to those of a
usufructuary, may not change the premises in such a way that
remaindermen or reversioners would have "reasonable ground
for objection thereto. '27 The Restatement of Property indicates
that it is objectionable to alter, erect, or remove a building, to
change the configuration of the surface, or to devote the use
of the land to a purpose substantially different.28 For instance,
it is objectionable to remodel a residence for use as a store, to
construct a new building to be used as a garage, to construct
a golf course upon farm land, and to clear timber for cultiva-
tion.29
The common law courts have sought to limit objections of the
owners of future interests by requiring that they be "reasonable"
and that the life tenant be shown to have used the property
contrary to "good husbandry." 30 Apparently, if the legal life
tenant can justify his changes and improvements on the basis
of acknowledged good business or farming practices, so long as
24. Id. art. 569.
25. Id. art. 552. This article has been applied by analogy to oil and gas wells,
Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960), discussed by Professor
Hardy in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1960-1961 Term-
Mineral Rights, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 329 (1961), noted 20 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 773 (1960).
26. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2819 (1959).
27. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 140 (1936).





he has not altered the general economic purpose of the land, he
is not held to have intruded upon the interests of the reversioner
or remainderman.
Only the German Civil Code would seem to allow the
usufructuary the flexibility to use the thing as would a prudent
owner. The usufructuary is tied to use it in accordance with a
predetermined economic purpose ;31 and though he may not trans-
form the thing or alter it materially, he may make changes "so
far as the economic purpose of the land is not altered."32 This
idea of flexibility seems to resemble quite closely the liberal in-
terpretations of the French non-alteration provisions espoused
by Planiol. 33 Throughout the section on usufruct in the German
Civil Code runs the notion that the usufructuary should be per-
mitted to keep up with the times, as is consistent with "orderly
management."
In summary, though a prudent owner might change the use
of his property in response to economic progress, a literal read-
ing of the Louisiana Civil Code would indicate that the Louisiana
usufructuary must continue in the traces of his former owner.
Conceivably the strict view of non-alteration would prohibit
such practices as crop rotation and contour plowing, the raising
of cattle on land no longer capable of supporting agriculture,
the conversion of the family residence into a boarding house, etc.
Sharing of Expenses with the Naked Owner
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that the owner shall be
responsible for "extraordinary" repairs, defined as "those of the
principal walls and vaults, and the replacing of beams and roofs
in toto, and the reconstruction of a levee entirely destroyed or
carried away. All others are ordinary repairs, for which the
usufructuary is responsible. '3 4 Applied literally, this would mean
that should the engine in a sugar mill require a major over-
haul, should the floor of a dwelling be ruined by termites, or
should a fishing camp be ruined by smoke damage from a fire,
the usufructuary thereof would be burdened with the cost of
31. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 1036.
32. Id. art. 1037.
33. Similiar flexibility is found in the use permitted to a legal life tenant in
Anglo-American law. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
34. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 572 (1870). Though this article seems to enumerate
all repairs to be classified as "extraordinary," Article 577, which classifies repairs
necessitated by partial damage due to accident or deterioration as "ordinary" is
clearly a mistranslation from the French antecedent and should read "extra-
ordinary" repairs. See WEST'S LSA-CIVIL CODE art. 571 (1952).
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the "ordinary" repairs. However, considering that these articles
were drawn before the Industrial Revolution with a view prim-
arily towards usufructs upon agricultural property, it is sug-
gested that the redactors may have sought to divide responsi-
bility for repairs in roughly the same manner as accountant
would allocate expenditures between capital and current ex-
penses. If this is correct, then the application of the repairs
provision, as written, would not be in keeping with the principles
upon which it was drafted. Perhaps it would be more in keeping
with their intent to divide expenses between usufructuary and
naked owner, as Planiol suggests, according to whether one
having full ownership would charge off the cost of repairs as cur-
rent expense or would add the cost to his capital account.3 5
Where the thing has been totally destroyed by accident or has
entirely deteriorated,36 neither the naked owner nor usufructuary
is obliged to rebuild it. If there is only partial damage from
those causes, rebuilding is classified as an ordinary repair.
3 7
During the existence of the usufruct, the naked owner may com-
pel the usufructuary to make those repairs he is bound to make,
under penalty of damagesA s If the owner makes repairs in the
interim between the establishment of the usufruct and the time
the usufrucuary actually enters into possession, the owner may
withhold possession until reimbursed for the price of those
repairs.3 9 However, the usufructuary may release himself from
these obligations by renouncing the usufruct, even if the naked
owner has instituted suit to compel him to repair, unless the
necessity for repairs has arisen from his own negligence.40 It has
35. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAw INSTITUTE) no. 2821 (1959). Article 606 of the French
Civil Code provides that "the usufructuary is only bound to do such repairs as are
required for the upkeep of the property (reparations d'entretien). Structural
repairs (grosses reparations) fall upon the owner, unless they have been rendered
necessary by the fact that since the usufruct began, the ordinary repairs of up-
keep have been neglected; in which case the usufructuary is bound to effect
structural repairs." (Wright's translation.) In the French Code, "structural
repairs" are defined in the same manner the Louisiana Code defines "extra-
ordinary" repairs. The French courts have not limited the concept of "structural
repairs" to "repairs to principal walls . . . to vaults, replacing the old beams and
putting on an entirely new roof, radical repairs of dykes, to the retaining walls
of a terrace or canal, repairs to walls forming enclosures" as listed in Article 606,
but have sought to delineate generically between structural and upkeep expenses.
Thus it has been held that the "remaking of an important part of a machine" is a
heavy or structural repair to be borne by the naked owner. Paris Jan. 5, 1905,
D.1905.2.23; Paris June 7, 1926, Gazette du Palais, July 8.
36. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 377 (1870).
37. Ibid. See note 34 supra.
38. Id. art. 573.
39. Id. art. 625.
40. Id. art. 575; Succession of Dougart, 30 La. Ann. 268 (1878).
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been held that the usufructuary may not renounce his usufruct
over only the portion of the property needing repair, but must
relinquish the whole right.
41 '
On the other hand, the usufructuary has no right of action
to compel the owner to make extraordinary repairs. If the own-
er wishes to rebuild, however, the usufructuary must permit him
to do so. If the owner does not, the usufructuary may advance
the necessary funds, subject to reimbursement, 42 as these are
not such constructions as he is bound to abandon to the owner
upon termination of the usufruct.43 According to Planiol, if the
French usufructuary is required to borrow money at interest to
pay for rebuilding, the naked owner is required only to reim-
burse him for the principal amount, the usufructuary being
obligated to pay the interest. 44 It is arguable that the same result
should follow in Louisiana by analogy to Article 579 of the
Civil Code, which requires reimbursement for extraordinary
charges, other than repairs, paid by the usufructuary only for
capital expended. Until the usufructuary is reimbursed for the
extraordinary repairs he has financed, he may remain in pos-
session.
45
Taxes and charges. The Civil Code provides that the Louisi-
ana usufructuary is liable for all annual charges, taxes, ground
rents, and regular charges imposed upon the thing subject to
usufruct.46 If the charge is "extraordinary or temporary he is
nevertheless bound to pay but may require reimbursement for
capital expended.
' 47
In France, ordinary charges are state taxes, ad valorem
taxes, municipal taxes, and all others charged upon real estate.
48
41. Judice v. Provost, 18 La. Ann. 601 (1866).
42. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 576 (1870).
43. Ordinarily, the usufructuary has no claim for reimbursement for improve-
ments he has made upon the thing during the usufruct. Id. art. 594.
44. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2822 (1959). Though not within the
scope of the present inquiry, it is interesting to speculate as to how laborers' and
mechanics' liens would attach to the property in the course of repairs. In theory
these liens would attach to the thing itself, and thus only naked ownership would
be affected. Should the property be sold to pay costs of repairs, would the
usufruct still be in force?
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 625 (1870) ; LeGoaster v. LaFon Asylum, 155 La.
159, 99 So. 22 (1924) (the usufructuary may recover expenses incurred in malking
extraordinary repairs only when he himself has made the advances; but if the
expenditures were by a third person, the usufructuary is not entitled to retain
possession of the thing).
46. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 578 (1870).
47. Id. art. 579.
48. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2820 (1959).
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In Germany, it would appear, however, that the usufructuary
would not be liable for direct taxes upon the property since he
is not bound for tax burdens laid on the "principal value" of the
thing.49 This would seem to indicate no ad valorem tax liability.
In Louisiana, it is clear that the usufructuary is liable for
ad valorem property taxes.10 It has also been held that he is
liable for paving taxes,51 though it is arguable that these are
extraordinary or temporary charges in that they "are of a nature
to augment the value of the property. ' 52 A recent case was held
that the usufructuary is not liable for income taxes resulting
from gains realized upon liquidated corporate stock subject to
usufruct, on the ground that capital gains taxation is not a direct
tax on the property, but upon the proceeds of a transaction in-
volving property.53 An early case has held that where property
ownership is a condition of entitlement to vote, the usufructuary
is not qualified, qua usufructuary.
54
Conclusions
From the foregoing, it should be amply clear that without
specification in a testament or trust instrument, the obligations
of the usufructuary to preserve the thing are most uncertain and
may bind him undesirably. It is suggested that the situation
might be considerably improved by adopting a clear distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary repairs and by permitting
more flexibility in the way the usufructuary may use the prop-
erty.
As to ordinary and extraordinary repairs, it is suggested
that the line could well be drawn, in principle, between repairs
which a full owner would consider capital in nature and those
which he would ordinarily consider to be expenses of upkeep.
5
This test could be applied to help answer some of the unanswered
questions, such as responsibility for insuring the property.56
49. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 1047.
50. Coleman v. Poydras Asylum, 17 La. Ann. 325 (1865); Succession of
Stewart, 100 So.2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
51. City v. Wire, 20 La. Ann. 500 (1868).
52. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 579 (1870). The usufructuary is not required to pay
such extraordinary charges.
53. Succession of Stewart, 100 So.2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
54. Endom v. Monrie, 112 La. 779, 36 So. 681 (1904). As to notice of tax
deficiency due to the usufructuary and naked owner before the property is sold
for taxes see Spears v. Spears, 173 La. 294, 136 So. 614 (1931); Spikes v.
O'Neal, 193 So. 487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
55. See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2821 (1959).
56. Id. no. 2817. The French usufructuary is not required to insure the
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Ordinarily, an insurable risk of loss is thought itself to be "extra-
ordinary" in that the insured does not feel that he can bear to
pay for loss out of funds available for ordinary upkeep; hence
the garden variety of policies insuring against fire and casualty
losses. The Civil Code provides that the naked owner is obligated
to rebuild, or at least reimburse, the usufructuary for rebuilding
where the thing is partially destroyed by accident, classifying
this sort of repair as extraordinary.57 Since fire and casualty in-
surance covering property subject to usufruct would cover losses
which the naked owner is bound to make good, he should proper-
ly bear the cost of the premiums. On the other hand, the usu-
fructuary is liable for extraordinary repairs where occasioned by
his fault or neglect.58 It would seem to follow that the cost of a
policy covering losses due to the usufructuary's negligence should
be borne by him.
As to the non-alteration of use provisions, it might be worth-
while to consider the German approach, which permits flexi-
bility to the usufructuary so long as he adheres to the "previous
economic purpose."5 9 This would seem to require the usufructuary
to use the land, say for agricultural purposes, but would permit
him to use land formerly under cultivation for grazing land, if
consistent with orderly administration. However, even the Ger-
man position is perhaps too limited in the context of a modern
economy. Perhaps the Code should not require the usufructuary
to continue to use land, in accordance with its previous eco-
nomical purpose but should permit him to use it in accordance
with a profitable one. Thus if the usufructuary could markedly
increase the revenue from farmland by converting it to a golf
property, though he recommends that the usufructuary should be required to con-
tinue the premiums. See 6 LAURENT. PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no
530 (1876). But cf. Bescancon, April 1, 1863 D.63. which analogized the usu-
fructuary's situation as prudent administrator to that of a tutor and held him
responsible to the naked owner for not having paid premiums where a loss had
occurred.
The German Civil Code provides explicitly for the payment of insurance
premiums. Article 1045 requires the usufructuary to insure against fire and
casualty "if orderly management so requires." The policy must be drawn so that
the owner has the right to the proceeds. If the property is already insured, the
usufructuary must continue the premiums. Both the usufructuary and the naked
owner may require that the proceeds be used in restoring the property or prb-
curing a substitute "as required by orderly management." GERMAN CIVIL CODE
art. 1046.
57. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 577 (1870).
58. Id. art. 571.
59. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 1036.
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course, he should be permitted to do so, provided he did not
substantially reduce its value upon termination of the usufruct.
Gerald LeVan
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
Where contribution is permitted among joint tortfeasors
bound in solido, each may recover any amount he has paid in
excess of his proportionate share.' This Comment will examine
the Louisiana law pertaining to the right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors, with particular attention to Article 2103 of the
Louisiana Civil Code as recently amended. 2
The State of the Law Prior to 1960
The common law denies the right of contribution.3 The
rationale of this rule seems to be that one should not be able
to allege his own turpitude as the basis of a right to recover
from another.4 However, the courts in some jurisdictions have
deviated from this, where the basis of joint liability is simple
negligence, and deny contribution only where the liability was
incurred through the commission of an intentional tort or gross
negligence.5 Furthermore, a significant number of states have
adopted statutes permitting contribution where one of two or
more defendants cast jointly and severally has paid more than
his proportionate share of the judgment.6
1. PROSSER, TORTS 246, § 46(f) (1951) ; Hodges, Contribution ant Indemnity
Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEx. L. REV. 150 (1947). Contribution among joint tort-
feasors should be distinguished from the doctrine of comparative negligence which
is applied in most civil law jurisdictions and in admiralty law. The doctrine of
comparative negligence is best exemplified where the court or jury apportions the
loss between two tortfeasors in proportion to their relative fault. Malone, Com-
parative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw
125 (1945) Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases, 99 U. PA. L. REV.
742 (1951); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REV. 465 (1953).
2. LA. CiVIL CODE art. 2103 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.
3. 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 10.2 (1956). This rule was first announced
in the case of Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng Rep. 1337 (1799).
4. See Reath, Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176 (1898).
5. Advanced Refrigeration v. United Motors Service, 69 Ga. App. 783, 26
S.E.2d 789 (1943) ; Constantive v. Scheidel, 249 Iowa 953, 90 N.W.2d 10 (1958) ;
East Coast Freight Lines v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 190 Md. 256,
58 A.2d 290 (1948). Kentucky and Virginia have limited contribution by adopt-
ing identical statutes providing: "Contribution among wrongdoers may be en-
forced where the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no moral
turpitude." KY. REV. STAT. § 412.030 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1950).
6. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 210 Ark. 575, 196 S.W.2d 919
(1946) ; Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburg Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165
